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Abstract:  The challenge of implementing EU quality and safety standards for food 
production and trading is one of the driving forces behind the restructuring of the agro-
food chains in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). The progress made in the 
compliance process not only varies amongst sectors and countries, but also among 
particular chains due to differences in their internal structure and strategies, and features of 
their political and economic surroundings. We construct a models to identify determinants 
of the diffusion rate of standards in a food chain under pre-accession conditions. We argue 
that adoption decisions in the food chain are determined by farmers’ and processors’ 
economic considerations. Factors such as pricing behavior, compliance costs and market 
structure, all of which influence the adoption of standards, are identified and discussed in 
the paper. The findings are used to test an econometric model utilizing data on Polish milk 
processing firms in the period between 2000 and 2003. The results indicate that input and 
output prices have a significant influence on the diffusion rate of standards. The dominance 
of large-scale holdings in the relevant procurement market significantly increases, whereas 
high compliance costs decrease the diffusion. Small cooperatives were found to face 
significant problems in procuring high quality raw materials compared to their competitors. 
The findings seem to be relevant for pre-accession countries (Bulgaria, Romania) currently 
facing structural problems in the animal sector that are similar to Poland’s prior to its 
accession to the European Union. 
Keywords: product quality, standards, EU enlargement, industrial organization. 
1. Introduction 
Economic transition in Eastern Europe has caused immense structural changes at all stages 
of the agri-food chains. Additionally, EU-membership stipulations required the applicant 
countries to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria, which include the adoption of the acquis   2
communautaire. For food chains, this means that all mandatory EU standards concerning 
food production, processing and retailing have to be met by the day of accession or after a 
fixed transitional period. Especially in structurally weak countries, the compliance process 
is relatively slow (see Berkum, 2005; Dries 2004; Pieniadz et al. 2003). 
Compliance with quality requirements is a problem in production as well as in 
procurement in the animal sector. However, the procurement stage in the dairy chain is 
considered to be particularly sensitive with regard to the diffusion of quality standards 
(Hockmann and Pieniadz, 2005). A strong incentive to comply at this stage results from the 
fact that after a granted transitional period, only high quality raw material may be accepted 
by the processors (i.e., at least extra-class of raw milk after 2007 in Poland and after 2009 
in Bulgaria and Romania). However, as early as the beginning of the 2000s, there was a 
high variation of input quality amongst the different dairy chains in the abovementioned 
countries. In 2001 Poland, for example, the market share of extra-class milk in procured 
milk varied between 20% and 90% (Boss 2004). 
The aim of this paper is to identify determinants of the diffusion rate of standards amongst 
the milk processing chains under pre-accession conditions. In the theoretical section of this 
paper, we will identify the factors by using a simple diffusion model. Based on theoretical 
considerations, an empirical model is constructed to test the hypothesis using data from the 
Polish dairy sector.   3
2. Theoretical  considerations
1 
2.1. Basic  assumption 
Farmers deliver raw material with different qualities to a processor. Manufacturing a high 
quality consumer good requires a minimum quality of a raw material (qmin)
2. If the quality 
is below qmin, the stability of the final products cannot be guaranteed, because undesirable 
attributes of the raw material (sensory, microbiological attributes) and problems in the 
processing stage result in the inferior quality of the final products. The prices of high and 
low quality products are wh and wl, respectively, with wh ≥ wl. 
Prices received by the farmers are correlated with product quality. High quality raw 
materials are remunerated by vh, while the price for low quality raw material is vl, with vh 
≥ v l. Corresponding to the choice of production techniques, the farmer can be of two 
different types: low (tl) or high (th) quality producers. The distribution of raw product 
quality differs with respect to the applied technique. We assume that technique th 
stochastically dominates tl to the first order, i.e., Φh(q) < Φl(q), ∀q. In addition, we assume 
that the choice of qmin does not allow an exact identification of the production technique, 
i.e., Φh(qmin) >0 and Φl(qmin)<1. 
Technique th requires additional resources or compliance costs (k) such as special animal 
feed, additional sanitary measures, and investment in building and equipment. We do not 
distinguish between fixed and variable costs and assume for simplicity that these costs are 
                                                 
1  Our theoretical part is based on Gutkind and Zilberman (1985). 
2  In the following, we use the terms "standards" and "minimal quality" as synonyms. In general, quality has to be 
characterized in a multidimensional fashion. See for instance Rosen (1974). In order to keep the theoretical 
consideration as simple as possible, we assume that quality is a one-dimensional variable.   4
constant for a farmer. Thus, the additional average cost of technique th decreases with an 
increase in the amount of raw material production (x). We make the simplifying 
assumption that compliance costs are the same for all agents. Thus, farmers differ only 
with respect to the scale of production. 
Because of higher value added, the processor has an incentive to specialize in high quality 
production. This requires farmers to deliver the corresponding quality of the raw material, 
which in turn requires a sufficient remuneration of the resources allocated to agricultural 
production. In the following we assume that, except vh, all prices are given by market 
structure. Thus, vh is the only decision variable to affect farmers’ behavior. After the 
processor has announced vh farmers decide to adopt or not to adopt production technique 
th. We assume that there is a marginal farmer (x*), who is indifferent between adoption or 
non-adoption. Since adoption costs decrease with farm size, those with higher production 
than x* will, by definition, be located in the group of high quality raw material producers, 
while smaller farms will stick to tl. 
The problem of making the optimal choice of vh can be sought at two stages. First, the 
processor announces a vh. Second, diffusion of the high quality techniques will occur 
according to the farm characteristics and the price of the high quality raw material. The 
optimal vh is found by backward induction. The processor takes the decision of farmers 
into account and fixes vh so that profits will be maximized. The price differential wh – wl 
also determines the rate of diffusion of high quality production techniques. 
2.2.  The marginal farmer 
Given all prices, a risk neutral farmer compares expected profits with and without the 
adoption of the high quality production technique. Under the assumptions discussed above, 
these are given by:   5
() k - ]    v    v - 1 [ x  E l h h h Φ + Φ = h π  and 
() ]    v     v - 1 [ x  E l l h l Φ + Φ = l π . 
Adoption occurs as long as  l h π π E E ≥ . The threshold is given by  
() ( ) l h v v
k
x*




2.3.  The processors decision 
The processor’s expected profits are given by: 
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where F(·) is the probability distribution function of farm size, i.e., F(x*) is the share of 






















The first term is negative and represents the loss of profits due to an increase in the price of 
high quality raw materials. The second term is the increase in profits because of a 
reduction in the threshold of adoption. Conducting the differentiation and collecting terms 
provides:   6
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Given that the second order condition holds, the comparative statics are given by the 
differentiation of (3) with respect to the corresponding factor
3. The individual effects are: 
0 >
α d
dvh , for α = k, vl, wl, Φl, X and  0 <
α d
dvh , for α = wh, Φh. 


























x F d * *
*) (
*) ( 1
, with α = wh, wl, vl, Φh, Φl, k, X  (4) 















, for α = wh, Φh. 
3. Empirical  implementation 
Our empirical application deals with the Polish dairy sector, where compliance with 
quality requirements is a production as well as a procurement problem. However, our 
primary interest is the relationship at the procurement stage, since this stage is considered 
to be particularly sensitive with regard to the diffusion of quality standards. 
                                                 
3  Whether the second order condition is satisfied or not depends on the shape of the distribution function. In order to 
eliminate this effect, we assume that the distribution of farm sizes can be approximated by a uniform distribution in 
the interval (xmin, xmax). In this case, the SOC is fulfilled.   7
3.1. Data  base 
Data on individual dairy processors in Poland were culled from several sources. Our main 
data base was provided by BOSS, Economic Information, Ltd., in Poland. The information 
is based on dairy processing company surveys in 2002 and 2003, and contains annual data 
from 2000 to 2002. Since the identity of the individual firms was known, additional 
information from regional statistics could be included: these are the location of each firm 
and its ownership status. Utilizing information about the location of a firm, a set of 
regional variables corresponding with the relevant market of the ith firm/chain have been 
compiled. 
Since participation in the survey differs between years, only data from dairies with the 
same number of observations for all variables were used for the analysis, as required by the 
estimation procedure of the simultaneous equation models. These concern 38 dairies in 
2000, 60 in 2001 and 50 in 2002. The three abovementioned sub-samples have been 
pooled, providing 148 observations. The original goal of the survey was to create a ranking 
of the Polish dairies. Hence, due to the voluntary participation in the ranking, it is likely 
that primarily firms with good business performance and prospectives are represented in 
the data set. The higher profit margin of the investigated sample compared to the average 
of the industry confirms our presumption (see Table 1, appendix). 
Most of the firms are large and medium-sized companies, although firm size ranges from 
40 employees up to 1,300 in the pooled survey data. The data set is dominated by 
cooperatives, which accounted for 93% (138) of the investigated dairies. A typical firm in 
the sample processes a wide spectrum of different products (drinking milk, yogurt, cheese, 
etc.). Thus, the sample is a good representation of the Polish dairy sector. An overview of 
the analyzed firms is provided in Table 1.   8
3.2. Parameterization 
The theoretical model suggests strong interactions along the food chains, i.e., expected 
profits of the dairy company (πi), diffusion of standards (Qi) and the prices for raw 
materials (vi). Because of these mutual relationships, the appropriate approach is to 
estimate a simultaneous equation model treating the abovementioned variables as jointly 
endogenous. One central variable in the diffusion model is the differential in retail prices 
for high and low quality products (wh – wl). Unfortunately, the data set provides only 
information about average regional prices (wi). We assume superior values of wi to be 
connected with a higher share of quality goods in the consumption bundles in a given 
regional market, and to be an outcome of a high demand for quality goods (Ii) and product 
differentiation in that market (DPi). In order to account for these determinants, we 
incorporate a retail price equation in the model. Given the specific nature of the diffusion 
model, the following simultaneous equation system will be used for estimation purposes: 
Processors profit:   πi = α1
 +α2vi +α3wi + α4zi + α5DFi + επ, i 
Diffusion rate of standards:  Qi = β1
 +β2vi +β3wi + β4xi + β5ki + β6DFi + εq, i 
Producer prices:  vi = ϕ1 + ϕ2wi + ϕ3xi + ϕ4ki + εv, i 
Retail prices:  wi = γ1 + γ1Ii + γ2DRi + εw, i,  
with zi denoting the total quantity of raw material of extra class milk procured by the ith 
firm and DFi firms’ specific strategy. The variable xi represents average farm size, and ki 
the compliance costs in the ith region. The definition and descriptive statistics of all 
variables used are reported in Table 2, appendix. However, some additional explanation 
might be useful:   9
Processors profit: Profits π are approximated by earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT). This variable is an adequate indicator of a company's financial performance, since 
it allows a comparison amongst heterogeneous firms omitting the effects of firm-specific 
financing and accounting decisions. With regard to the equation for principal profits, we 
expect a negative sign by α2 and positive sign by α3 and α4. Depending on the firm-specific 
strategy, different effects of DF can be expected. Thus, the variable DF was approximated 
by a firm-specific dummy variable indicating different ownership structures. There is 
evidence suggesting private firms perform better than cooperatives. Additionally, large 
cooperatives are more likely to face financial disadvantages due to their complex 
governance structures compared to their smaller competitors (Fulton, 2001). To analyze 
the effects of the ownership structure, we differentiate among the private dairies and 
cooperatives of different sizes in further analysis. Information on the ownership structure 
was coded in three binary dummy variables, one of them indicates private firms (PRIV). 
We use two dummy variables for small (COSM) and large (COLG) cooperatives and do 
not take into account intermediate co-ops (procuring between 35 and 75 m liter raw milk 
p.a.). We do not differentiate between private firms of different size since there were only 
10 observations on private dairies in the sample. The expected sequence of the estimates is 
αPRIV > αCOSM > αCOLG. 
Diffusion rate of standards: There is a strong correlation between the diffusion rate of the 
EU standards and the (microbiological) quality of raw milk (Hockmann and Pieniadz 
2005). Hence, diffusion (Q) is captured by the degree of compliance with EU-standards 
within the dairy companies. The dependent variable is defined as a share of the “extra” 
class raw milk in the total milk procurement of the ith milk-processing firm. According to 
our theoretical model, we assume that β2, β3, and β4 are greater and β5 lower than zero.   10
Thus, the higher w, r, and x are, the higher the diffusion rate of quality standards is. Due 
to the lack of a more appropriate measure, we proxy the compliance costs, k, by an index 
based on draft force resources in agriculture. We assume a high share of living horsepower 
in the total draft force resources (living, mechanical horse power) to be an indicator of a 
general outdated production technique in a considered region. An obstacle technique 
requires additional investments and increases compliance costs. Since higher compliance 
costs are associated with a lower diffusion rate, we still expect a negative influence of this 
variable on the quality of procured milk. There are no a priori assumptions about the 
influence of the ownership structure on the diffusion rate of standards. However, it is likely 
that due to their member commitment, agents delivering to a cooperative have some 
additional motivation to adopt standards. On the other hand, private dairies have more 
freedom to select high quality producers, which would suggest a higher diffusion rate as 
far as private firm as integrators are considered. 
Producer prices: In the theoretical part we assume the optimal producer price to be found 
by backward induction, i.e., after the processor has calculated his profit. Thus, inherently, v 
can be seen as a function of x, w and k. We expect ϕ2 and ϕ3 to be positive and ϕ4 to be 
negative. 
Retail prices: With regard to the retail price equation, demand for high quality products (I) 
has been approximated by the disposal income of the consumer in the vicinity of the ith 
dairy. According to Engel’s curve, there is a positive correlation between quantity 
demanded for quality products and the consumer’s income. Thus, we can expect an 
increase in final prices as the consumer’s income level (I) grows. Since there is a positive 
correlation between the average price and the average quality level in a market, we 
presume regions with a higher level of foreign investments to feature higher quality and   11
hence average price for the final product. Thus, the average prices for the final product 
should differ as far as c.p. regions with and without FDI in the dairy sector are considered. 
This information has been coded in the corresponding dummy variable DP. We expect a 
positive effect of DP on the average retail price. 
3.3. Estimation  and  inference 
The 3SLS model was estimated using pooled survey data from the three sub-samples in the 
years 2000 –2002.
4 The estimation results are reported in Table 3, appendix. The high 
significance of the F-test indicates joint significance and confirms the relevance of the 
variable used in the model. In principle, our hypothesis regarding the impact of the 
individual variables on the endogenous variables cannot be rejected. All estimated 
coefficients yielded the expected sign and are highly significant in most cases. 
Nevertheless, the ownership structure, which was supposed to have an ambiguous effect, 
especially on the diffusion rate, requires additional comments. 
Cooperatives seem to face different problems as far as different firm size is considered. 
The estimated coefficients and significance levels suggest that small co-ops have a 
negative effect on the diffusion rate of standards at the procurement stage. Among the 
large cooperatives, as well as private dairies, no significant influence of the ownership on 
the diffusion rate could be found. This suggests that milk chains with a small cooperative 
as an integrator face more problems when procuring high quality raw milk. One 
explanation could be that small co-ops included in the investigated sample are mainly 
located in highly competitive regions where a high number of dairies must share the 
                                                 
4  The computer package LIMDEP was used to estimate the model parameters. The form of the model was established 
based on theory and empirical testing for best fit. For the estimation procedure see Greene (2005).   12
relevant procurement market. Small co-ops are likely to have lower purchasing power, 
and hence to lose the high quality producers. However, purchasing relatively poor-quality 
inputs seems not to affect the performance of the small cooperatives, as suggest by the 
estimated coefficient in the profit-equation. Thus, while large cooperatives appear to suffer 
from considerable inefficiencies, small co-ops are more likely to focus on a core set of 
activities and did relatively well in the investigated period. 
Despite the high significance of the individual estimates, our analysis may appear limited 
due to the low explanatory power, as indicated by the respective R
2 values. Especially the 
variables used in the diffusion-equation gives a value of 0.29, which appears to be an 
unimpressive value of the model fit. One of the reasons could be the omission of important 
variables in our theoretical and empirical model, i.e., the competition amongst the firms. 
We can also follow the low explanatory power in such a way that our approximations are 
rather rough and in some cases may not be well-suited for capturing the effect as provided 
by the theoretical model. On the other hand, we argue that the low explanatory power of 
our empirical model is something we have expected, since we applied average regional 
prices and a regional proxy for compliance costs. Furthermore, we consider the group of 
farmers delivering to the ith dairy to be one decision-maker (agent). However, the decision 
regarding the adoption of standards set by the purchaser is not a joint decision of the group 
of farmers delivering to the ith firm. Due to the lack of appropriate data we could not 
account for all individual negotiations among the milk producers and the milk processing 
firm (i.e., producer-specific payments, vertical relationships, agreements). 
4. Conclusions 
Our main interest was to analyze the diffusion of the EU-quality standards in the Polish 
dairy chains. To take account for the interdependencies along the dairy chain, we estimated   13
a multiple equations model (3SLS) treating diffusion rate, processors profit, producer 
and retail price as endogenous variables. The results confirm the theoretical findings and 
suggest, first of all, that the adoption of standards is an economic activity guided by 
producers’ and processors’ cost and benefits calculations. Hence, the farmer will improve a 
production technique in order to comply with standards only if the purchasers distinguish 
among the high and low quality producers and are able to remunerate their additional 
efforts towards higher quality. For the processing firm, a separating solution also seems to 
be a superior one, especially if an increasing demand for high quality consumer products 
exists. 
With regard to mandatory quality standards, farmers have to accomplish the necessary 
upgrading by the expire date of the transitional period or they have to renounce deliveries 
to the market - or even production - altogether. Since there is a natural tendency to 
postpone the decision to adopt, the full compliance will occur only if the agents have no 
other alternatives. The farmer’s decision towards compliance before the deadline depends 
on the evolution of costs and benefits over time. Our result suggests that an increase in the 
price for high quality material fosters adoption, and the same holds for a decrease in 
compliance costs. The empirical analysis also provides evidence that a dominance of large-
scale holdings in the relevant procurement market significantly increases diffusion. Since 
Poland faces considerable structural problems in animal production, one opportunity to 
push forward the diffusion rate of standards, and hence the efficiency of the dairy chain, is 
to increase horizontal integration on the agricultural level. These factors can also be of 
relevance for other pre-accession countries with a dominance of small-scale holdings, such 
as Bulgaria and Romania.   14
The empirical results confirm that the processor should have an incentive to specialize in 
high quality production since procuring high quality raw materials is c.p. positively 
correlated with the achieved profits. More subtly, however, the achievement of positive 
profits in the large cooperatives is very likely to be hampered by their considerable 
inefficiencies due to the complexity and low transparency of governance structures. Thus, 
depending on ownership status, the performance of the milk processing firms would likely 
also differ in the future. In addition, it is evident that large cooperatives may even have 
more competitive disadvantages in the dairy market in the future, while their performance 
enhancements will be hampered by more efficient private firms in the enlarged European 
Union. 
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Table 1:   Relevance of the investigated sample 
 Employees  Revenue  NPM 
  Sample 
in 1000 






Share in the 
dairy 
industry 
Sample  Dairy 
industry 
2000 12.4  25%  792.7  32%  0.79 0.10 
2001 17.5  36% 1496.9  50%  1.98 0.04 
2002 14.7  32% 1318.4  47%  2.17 0.45 
Sources: BOSS (2004), IERiGZ (var. issues), GUS (var. issues b). 
Note:  NPM: Net Profit Margins: A ratio of profitability calculated as net earnings divided by revenues.   17






Q  Share of “extra” class raw milk in the total milk 





π  Firm-specific earnings before interest and taxes in m 





v  Average procurement price for raw milk in a region, 





w  Average retail prices for drinking milk in a region, 





x  Farm size, defined as share of farms that own more 






k  Proxy for compliance costs in a region, defined as 
share of “live power" of draft horses in the total draft 





z  Firm specific quantity of the procured extra-class raw 





I  Annual gross disposable income per capita in a region, 





COSM  Dummy variable for a small cooperative: the variable 
is set equal to one if the firm procures less than 35 m 





COLG  Dummy variable for a large cooperative: the variable 
takes the value one if the firm procures more than 75 









DP  Dummy variable for product differentiation; the 
variable is set equal to one if there is at least one 





Source: BOSS (2004), GUS 2001, GUS 2005, GUS (var. issues a), internet research, telephone survey. 
Note:  Number of observations: 148.   18
Table 3: 3SLS estimates of diffusion model for the Polish dairy sector 
 Dependent  Variable  Explanatory 
Variable    Profit  Diffusion  Proc. price  Retail price 
 Symbol  π  Q v w 


















of extra-class milk 
z  0.160***
(0.009) 
−  −  − 




−  − 











−  − 




−  − 
Private dairy  PRIV  8.336***
(2.629) 
- 0.018  
(0.049) 
−  − 














DP  −  −  −  0.021***
(0.004) 
R
2    0.70 0.29 0.38 0.40 
DW    1.95 2.35 2.02 1.78 








Note:  ***, **, * indicate that the effect of a variable is significant at the 1, 5 or 10 percent level, respectively. 